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Abstract 
This note explores the link between the effort level to strengthen institutional quality and the nature of the fiscal policy 
game among interdependent economies plagued by corruption. Every country has a lower incentive to improve public 
governance when the effort made abroad to remedy institutional deficiencies becomes weaker. More importantly, the 
model highlights a possible trade-off between fighting corruption in interrelated developing countries and promoting 
fiscal policy coordination among them: cooperation goes together with the acceptance of more corruption. It follows 
that poor-institution traps can be Pareto-improving.
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     1 Introduction
Weak governance structures and corruption are regarded as an issue of concern
in many economies, particularly developing and transition ones, and have come
to the fore in international policy fora during the past decade. Some recent
studies, however, suggest that corruption might turn out to be less damaging
than feared, or even bene￿cial, in countries stuck in very ine¢ cient political
systems (Aidt, Dutta and Sena, 2008; MØon and Weill, 2010). The main argu-
ment in favor of corruption in the academic literature stems from the "grease
the wheels" assumption: corruption constitutes a distortion that partly corrects
some other pre-existing distortions in the economic decision-making process,
hence a positive e⁄ect on welfare.
The present work is in line with these ￿ndings and provides a rationale for
corruption in a game-theoretic model that combines two strands of research.
This note explicitly links the e⁄ort aimed at promoting better governance to
￿scal policy strategic interactions among interdependent countries plagued by
corruption and de￿cient law enforcement. As in Hefeker (2010), low institu-
tional quality is modeled as a revenue leakage in the budget constraint of the
government, and ￿scal policy consists in choosing the level of distortionary taxes
on output. The game takes place in two stages: each government must ￿rst de-
termine its e⁄ort to improve institutional quality, then sets ￿scal policy, either
cooperatively or not.
Three points emerge from this analysis. First, a nation￿ s incentive to carry
out governance reforms directly depends on anti-corruption e⁄orts undertaken
abroad: domestic authorities struggle less with corruption if foreign countries
postpone their e⁄orts on the matter. Second, a trade-o⁄ appears between ￿scal
cooperation and institutional quality improvement initiatives, in the sense that
the existing degree of corruption turns out to be higher if ￿scal policies are
coordinated internationally. Given that such a coordination is rather di¢ cult
to implement in practice, especially for authorities whose commitment ability is
limited, a second-best solution could be to allow countries to have larger gover-
nance failures, contrary to the conventional view in policy circles. Third, joint
e⁄orts to curb corruption, such as those promoted by agencies like the World
Bank and the International Monetary Fund, appear to be counterproductive. In
this model, cooperation at the ￿rst stage of the game leads every policy-maker
to tackle the corruption problem still less strongly, and the ￿rst best is indeed
achieved when making the smallest e⁄orts to strengthen institutional quality.
The study thus suggests that some developing nations might eventually do little
to escape from their poor-institution trap.
The rest of the note is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the two-stage
set-up. Section 3 compares the Nash and cooperative solutions for the second
stage under the assumption that authorities unilaterally ￿x their e⁄ort level
regarding institutional quality. This assumption is then relaxed in Section 4 for
considering the benchmark scenario in terms of welfare with full cooperation at
both stages. Section 5 concludes.
12 The model
I use a reduced-form model describing strategic interactions between two coun-
tries, A and B, supposed to be identical and interrelated through ￿scal spillovers.
Deviations of output (y) from its natural level (normalized to zero for simplicity)
depend on both domestic and foreign corporate tax rates (￿):
yi = ￿￿￿i + ￿￿j (1)
with ￿ > ￿ = 0; i;j = A;B and i 6= j. A rise in the domestic tax burden leads to
a fall in home output because of distortions in economic behavior and activity
in the absence of lump-sum taxation, as in the class of models ￿ la Alesina
and Tabellini (1987). Moreover, the hypothesis of unproductive government
expenditure in such models seems more applicable to economies su⁄ering from
endemic corruption. On the other hand, an increase in the foreign tax rate
exerts a positive e⁄ect on domestic activity: the positive sign of the foreign
￿scal multiplier (￿) can be explained by the move of ￿rms towards the most
attractive ￿scal environment and by the better national price competitiveness
due to the tax rate di⁄erential. It follows that A and B are engaged in a tax
competition game leading them to ine¢ ciently set a too low tax rate in the
absence of international cooperation. In a Nash game, each government will
indeed seek to encourage the in￿ ow of productive resources through foreign
investment by further reducing the ￿scal burden on the ￿rms located within its
national boundary.
There is no public debt and seigniorage transferred to the government is
also omitted since monetary policy is not considered here.1 Accordingly, public
spending (g) can be ￿nanced solely by corporate taxes. The important point is
that each government is supposed to su⁄er from a revenue leakage because of
corruption and other various failures, such as bad governance or outdated and
ine¢ cient tax legislation and collection system. Revenue shortages are simply
modeled by a variable (c) that enters the budget constraint:
gi = ￿i ￿ ci (2)
The larger the value taken by ci, the greater will be the revenue leakage
for country i (i = A;B). This variable can thus be interpreted as an inverse
measure of the e⁄orts undertaken by authorities to stamp out corruption and
to promote better governance.
Government i (i = A;B) minimizes the following quadratic function:
Li = syy2
i + sg (gi ￿ g)
2 + sc (ci ￿ c)
2 (3)
1Seigniorage remains a relatively signi￿cant source of revenue for some developing nations.
This simpli￿cation, however, seems acceptable if one admits that every country￿ s central bank
in the model is independent and pursues a strict in￿ation-targeting rule in order to establish
its credibility. It can moreover explain the absence of time-inconsistency problems in eq. (1).
Anyway, this assumption does not qualitatively alter the conclusions of the study because
spillovers concern ￿scal policy only.
2Each policy-maker is concerned with stabilizing output around its natural
level and avoiding public spending deviations from a target g (g > 0). A positive
target value re￿ ects the need to provide a minimum amount of public goods for
citizens as well as partisan political business cycle considerations, like oppor-
tunistic reelection motives. The third argument in the above loss function is
borrowed from Hefeker (2010) and represents the political cost of ￿ghting cor-
ruption. The parameter c can be interpreted as the initial degree of corruption
(c > 0). A positive deviation involves a loss because more corruption may imply
a decrease in foreign investments or less support from international organiza-
tions. But a corruption level less than c turns out to be costly as well, on account
of the loss of support from interest groups having bene￿ted from corruption, or
because of the loss of economic rents for some bureaucrats. sy, sg and sc denote
the weights placed on these various objectives (sy;sg;sc = 0;sy + sg + sc = 1).
I consider a two-stage decision-making process. Each of these stages can be
played cooperatively or non-cooperatively. The initial stage can be described
as an institutional design stage during which both countries have to select their
e⁄ort level to improve governance, which formally corresponds to the calculation
of the optimal value of the control variable ci (i = A;B). The choice of ci is
made on the basis of a trade-o⁄ between the need to curtail corruption for
increasing the overall available resources and the cost of governance reforms.
Subsequently, at the ￿scal policy implementation stage, authorities select their
tax rate ￿i (i = A;B) according to a trade-o⁄ between the supply of public
goods and output stabilization, given the observed level of corruption.
3 The cooperation-corruption trade-o⁄
It is supposed in this section that there is no cooperation between A and B at
the institutional design stage. The Nash (N) and cooperative (C) equilibria for
the second stage will be examined successively.
3.1 The case of uncoordinated ￿scal policies
Let us start with the presumably most realistic con￿guration (i.e. a Nash be-
havior at every stage of the game). Each player simultaneously sets its control
variable without considering the other player￿ s choice nor the impact of its own
strategy on the other￿ s payo⁄. The game is solved by backward induction from
the second stage. The best-response function of government i to country j￿ s ￿s-
cal policy for a given degree of corruption ci (i;j = A;B;i 6= j) is (see appendix
A for all calculation details):
￿i =
sg (g + ci) + ￿￿sy￿j
sg + ￿2sy
(4)
A rise in the desired public spending amount or in corruption leads player i
to set a higher tax rate for minimizing the deviation from g ((@￿i)=(@g) > 0 and
3(@￿i)=(@ci) > 0). The same holds true in the case of a rise in country j￿ s tax
rate ((@￿i)=(@￿j) > 0): as ￿scal spillovers are positive, an increase in taxes in
country A stimulates economic activity in B, thereby providing government B
with some additional scope for getting closer to its target g, hence an increase
in ￿B. Taxes thus are strategic complements in the present model.
Substituting (4) for ￿i and its counterpart for ￿j into (3) gives a two-variable
function for the ￿rst stage that has to be minimized with respect to ci and cj.
The ensuing ￿rst-order conditions for A and B yield a level of institutional e⁄ort
in each economy that depends on the e⁄ort made abroad and thus correspond
to A￿ s and B￿ s reaction functions associated with anti-corruption policies. It is
shown in Appendix A that i￿ s best response at the ￿rst stage can be written as:
ci =
￿0c ￿ ￿2 [(￿ ￿ ￿)[sg + ￿(￿ + ￿)sy]g ￿ ￿sgcj]
￿0 + ￿1
(5)
where ￿0;￿1;￿2 > 0 (see Appendix A for the de￿nition of these terms).
The higher is the starting degree of corruption, the lower is the e⁄ort aimed
at alleviating the problem because of political costs (i.e. (@ci)=(@c) > 0). Con-
versely, corruption is decreasing with the targeted amount of public spending
in order to limit the revenue leakage (i.e. (@ci)=(@g) < 0). The main point in
eq. (5) is the positive sign of (@ci)=(@cj), hence the proposition below:
Proposition 1 A country makes smaller e⁄orts for ￿ghting corruption within
its borders and for improving the quality of its institutions if governance and
corruption issues receive less attention abroad.
The degree of corruption in one country a⁄ects the other country￿ s policy
decisions through its impact on taxes. Governance and anti-corruption reforms
(i.e. the choice of cA and cB at the ￿rst stage) appear here to be strategic
complements at the international level since ￿scal policies that depend on these
measures are strategic complements too at the second stage. If A makes less
e⁄ort for strengthening institutional quality, and so tolerates a rise in cA, the
tax rate ￿A needed to provide a given amount of public goods will be higher,
which will allow government B to ￿x a greater tax rate in turn given its public
spending objective, as seen above. In that case there will be less need for B
to struggle with corruption. This multi-country framework thus shows that the
existing corruption level partly depends on the extent of the problem abroad,
and especially that there is little strategic incentive to deal with poor-institution
traps within an environment where neighboring countries do not care much
about such an issue.
Solving the system constituted by eq. (5) and its counterpart for country j





2Given the symmetry of the model, the country index is omitted in the equilibrium expres-
sions. The ￿rst and second superscript letters denote the cooperative (C) or non-cooperative
(N) nature of the decision-making process of the ￿rst and second stages, respectively.
4where ￿0;￿1 > 0 (see Appendix A for the de￿nition of these terms).
The equilibrium tax rate for the second stage is found by substituting (6)
for ci and cj back into the reaction function (4):
￿NN =
￿0sg (c + g)
[sg + ￿(￿ ￿ ￿)sy](￿0 + ￿1)
(7)
Substituting (7) for ￿A and ￿B into (1) and (2) gives the values of output
















3.2 The case of coordinated ￿scal policies
Let us now suppose that ￿scal policies are run in a cooperative fashion during
the second stage, which formally amounts to minimizing the sum of national
losses with respect to ￿A and ￿B when both players￿objective functions are
weighted equally. Remember that the anti-corruption e⁄ort is still determined
unilaterally by authorities at the ￿rst stage. It is shown in Appendix B that the
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where ￿0;￿1 > 0 (see Appendix B for the de￿nition of these terms).














The comparison of results permits a second proposition to be established:
Proposition 2 There is a trade-o⁄ between ￿scal policy coordination and the
incentive to improve institutional quality: the degree of corruption in every coun-
try is always more important if ￿scal policies are coordinated internationally.
The equilibrium tax rate is greater under cooperation at the implementation
stage (￿NC > ￿NN) because governments internalize the positive externality
generated by ￿scal policy on foreign output. The increase in taxes is taken into
account ex ante, at the institutional design stage, when selecting the optimal
e⁄ort level: for a targeted level of public expenditure, authorities, knowing that
5taxes will be raised, are less prone to tackle the governance issue because of the
political cost associated with institutional reforms, hence a lower e⁄ort and so
more corruption (cNC > cNN). The rise in corruption is however not harmful
since ￿scal policies are coordinated: the lower output level due to higher taxes
is more than o⁄set by larger public expenditure and by a smaller gap between
the ￿nal corruption level and the initial one, so both countries are eventually
better o⁄ (LNN > LNC).
International ￿scal policy coordination, however, is very rare in practice,
despite the welfare gain.3 Indeed, there is every reason to believe that the
problem is even more acute in developing or transition nations facing weak
commitment ability and law enforcement. Consequently, an alternative to be
considered for improving welfare could be to tolerate more corruption in order to
stop or at least to curb tax competition among countries. More generally, even
if there is no cooperation at the second stage, any increase in the corruption
level can be shown to be welfare-enhancing in this model. This is a corollary of
Proposition 2:
Corollary 3 A rise in corruption exerts a positive e⁄ect on welfare by leading
countries to set higher tax rates. Corruption can thus be seen as a second-best
mechanism for internalizing spillovers among interdependent economies and for
limiting tax competition.
The argument can be presented graphically in a Hamada diagram by making
use of eq. (4), i.e. the best-response function of player i to any strategy of player
j (i;j = A;B;i 6= j) in the Nash game (see ￿g. 1 in Appendix 3). A￿ s and B￿ s
reaction functions are upward-sloping in the (￿A;￿B) space. According to (4), a
rise in ci meaning more corruption does not alter the slope of i￿ s reaction function
and results in its translation towards larger values of ￿i (dashed straight lines),
thereby shifting the Nash equilibrium to the upper right on the 45-degree line,
as if ￿scal policies were coordinated.
4 Accepting corruption: a vice or a virtue?
I ￿nally examine the ￿rst-best solution associated with cooperation at both
stages. The equilibrium values for the e⁄ort level, taxes and welfare losses then
are (see Appendix D for all calculation details):
cCC =
h
sg + (￿ ￿ ￿)
2 sy
i
scc ￿ (￿ ￿ ￿)
2 sgsyg
scsg + (￿ ￿ ￿)
2 (sc + sg)sy
(12)
￿CC =
scsg (c + g)
scsg + (￿ ￿ ￿)
2 (sc + sg)sy
(13)
3Besides the temptation to renege on commitments, the problem has mainly to do with
the rigidity inherent in the ￿scal decision-making process, and with political business cycle
considerations that prompt short-termist governments to give preference to their own interests
at the expense of the economic situation abroad.
6LCC =
(￿ ￿ ￿)
2 scsgsy (c + g)
2
scsg + (￿ ￿ ￿)
2 (sc + sg)sy
(14)
cCC > cNC > cNN and ￿CC > ￿NC > ￿NN always hold. Unlike the
previous case, player i now internalizes at the ￿rst stage the impact of a change
in ci on yj and gj (i;j = A;B;i 6= j). From an ex ante perspective, more
domestic corruption is associated with greater public expenditure abroad (see
the second line of eq. (B3) in Appendix B: (@gj)=(@ci) > 0): as already seen, a
rise in ci allows government j to increase taxes. The impact of a change in the
domestic corruption level on foreign output is unclear (see the ￿rst line of (B3):
(@yj)=(@ci) ? 0): on the one hand, an increase in ci exerts a positive spillover
on yj because of the subsequent rise in ￿i; on the other hand, it also leads to a
rise in ￿j that is damaging for output yj. However, the net e⁄ect of domestic
corruption on foreign welfare turns out to be positive (i.e. (@Vj)=(@ci) < 0
from (B3)). Therefore, the best strategy is indeed to pay even less attention
to institutional quality, hence an additional rise in the equilibrium tax rate, so
yNN > yNC > yCC. However, as gNC > gCC > gNN, the positive e⁄ects of
cooperation on public spending outweigh the deterioration of output. The ￿rst
best is achieved because all spillovers are internalized, so LNN > LCN > LCC.
According to the model, any attempt to work out joint anti-corruption mea-
sures in interrelated countries, maybe under the patronage of international agen-
cies,4 should be doomed to failure. But if corruption can be a virtue from a
purely academic viewpoint, it is still regarded in international policy fora as a
vice that must be combated, hence the second corollary from Proposition 2:
Corollary 4 Reaching the ￿rst-best outcome seems, at the very least, highly
unlikely since it would involve lower anti-corruption e⁄orts, which is the exact
opposite of what is required by international organizations.
5 Conclusion
This paper has highlighted three points. First, the domestic corruption level
has an impact on foreign welfare, with the result that the development of a
poor-institution trap in one country is likely to lead to the same phenomenon
in neighboring economies. Second, a rise in corruption can in theory make
countries better o⁄ by involving a change in national policies that stops or at
least weakens tax competition. Third, as a consequence of the previous result,
and given the prevailing view of politics on the matter, the ￿rst best appears
to be unrealistic here, as it would lead authorities to deliberately reduce their
e⁄ort to combat corruption.
4The United Nations Convention against Corruption (UNCAC), adopted in October 2003
and entered into force in December 2005, clearly constitutes the best illustration of this type
of initiative, as it obliges every member state to implement a wide range of anti-corruption
measures.
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A The fully non-cooperative equilibrium
The model is solved backwards from the second stage, at which each policy-
maker chooses the corporate tax rate in a non-cooperative fashion, taking as
given the corruption level. Substituting (1) and (2) into (3) and then minimizing
it with respect to ￿i yields (4) in the main text (with i;j = A;B;i 6= j):
￿i =
sg (g + ci) + ￿￿sy￿j
sg + ￿2sy
(A1)





2g + ci + cj
sg + ￿(￿ ￿ ￿)sy
+
ci ￿ cj
sg + ￿(￿ + ￿)sy
￿
(A2)
Now substitute the above equation and its counterpart for country j into (3)
for obtaining a two-variable function at the ￿rst stage of the game:






(￿ ￿ ￿)(2g + ci + cj)
sg + ￿(￿ ￿ ￿)sy
￿
(￿ + ￿)(ci ￿ cj)







￿2g ￿ 2ci +
(2g + ci + cj)sg
sg + ￿(￿ ￿ ￿)sy
+
(ci ￿ cj)sg
sg + ￿(￿ + ￿)sy
￿￿2
+sc (ci ￿ c)
2 (A3)
The game at the ￿rst stage is non-cooperative, too. Accordingly, the e⁄ort
by government i (i = A;B) to ￿ght corruption is determined from the ￿rst-order
condition @Vi
@ci = 0, which gives (5) in the main text:
ci =






































Solving the system made of the ￿rst-order conditions at the institutional
design stage for ci and cj gives the optimal anti-corruption e⁄ort (which is





with the ￿rst and second superscript letters denoting the nature of the game at
the ￿rst and second stages, respectively, and where:
￿ ￿0 ￿ [sg + ￿(￿ ￿ ￿)sy]
2 [sg + ￿(￿ + ￿)sy]sc











Substitute (A5) into the ￿rst-order conditions calculated for the second stage
(eq. (A1) and its counterpart for j) and solve the ensuing system to obtain the
equilibrium tax rate:
￿NN =
￿0sg (c + g)
[sg + ￿(￿ ￿ ￿)sy](￿0 + ￿1)
(A6)
The substitution of (A5) and (A6) into (1) and (2) in the main text results
in:
yNN = ￿
(￿ ￿ ￿)￿0sg (c + g)
[sg + ￿(￿ ￿ ￿)sy](￿0 + ￿1)
(A7)
gNN ￿ g = ￿
￿(￿ ￿ ￿)￿0sy (c + g)
[sg + ￿(￿ ￿ ￿)sy](￿0 + ￿1)
(A8)
Moreover, the di⁄erence between the degree of corruption in equilibrium and
the initial level c is:
cNN ￿ c = ￿
￿1 (c + g)
￿0 + ￿1
(A9)
The welfare loss in the fully non-cooperative game is ￿nally calculated by















9B The case of coordinated ￿scal policies
The e⁄ort level is still chosen in a non-cooperative fashion at the institutional
design stage of the game, but ￿scal policies now are internationally coordinated
at the second stage. For the sake of simplicity, it is assumed that both countries￿
losses are weighted equally, so each policy-maker must di⁄erentiate the sum
LA + LB with respect to its tax rate. Policy-maker i￿ s ￿rst-order condition
under cooperation is (with i;j = A;B;i 6= j):
￿i =
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Substitute (B2) and its counterpart for j into the objective function (3) in
the main text to obtain:






(￿ ￿ ￿)(2g + ci + cj)
sg + (￿ ￿ ￿)
2 sy
￿
(￿ + ￿)(ci ￿ cj)








￿2g ￿ 2ci +
(2g + ci + cj)sg




sg + (￿ + ￿)
2 sy
!#2
+sc (ci ￿ c)
2 (B3)
The ￿rst-order condition @Vi
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The optimal e⁄ort level at the ￿rst stage follows from the resolution of the






























The equilibrium tax rate under cooperation at the second stage is obtained
by substituting (B5) into (B2):
￿NC =
￿0sg (c + g)
h





By making use of the two above results with (1) and (2) in the main text,
one arrives at:
yNC = ￿
(￿ ￿ ￿)￿0sg (c + g)
h





gNC ￿ g = ￿
(￿ ￿ ￿)
2 ￿0sy (c + g)
h






cNC ￿ c = ￿
￿1 (c + g)
￿0 + ￿1
(B9)
The welfare loss when ￿scal policies are coordinated is ￿nally calculated with














C The Hamada diagram
Fig. 1. The e⁄ect of corruption on the Nash equilibrium
11D The ￿rst-best outcome
The benchmark in terms of welfare is associated with a cooperative behavior
at both stages. The relevant ￿rst-stage objective function is therefore given






















































Solving the system made of eq. (D1) and its counterpart for country j yields
the optimal e⁄ort under cooperation at the design stage:
cCC =
h
sg + (￿ ￿ ￿)
2 sy
i
scc ￿ (￿ ￿ ￿)
2 sgsyg
scsg + (￿ ￿ ￿)
2 (sc + sg)sy
(D2)
Substituting back this value into eq. (B2) in Appendix B then gives the
equilibrium tax rate:
￿CC =
scsg (c + g)
scsg + (￿ ￿ ￿)
2 (sc + sg)sy
(D3)
By making use of (1) and (2), one arrives at:
yCC = ￿
(￿ ￿ ￿)scsg (c + g)
scsg + (￿ ￿ ￿)
2 (sc + sg)sy
(D4)
gCC ￿ g = ￿
(￿ ￿ ￿)
2 scsy (c + g)
scsg + (￿ ￿ ￿)
2 (sc + sg)sy
(D5)
Moreover, one has:
cCC ￿ c = ￿
(￿ ￿ ￿)
2 sgsy (c + g)
scsg + (￿ ￿ ￿)
2 (sc + sg)sy
(D6)
The welfare loss of each country is ￿nally given by:
LCC =
(￿ ￿ ￿)
2 scsgsy (c + g)
2
scsg + (￿ ￿ ￿)
2 (sc + sg)sy
(D7)
12